Recent research finds that people respond more generously to identified victims compared to abstract victims. For example, people are more generous towards a single, identified victim compared to a group of victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005) and compared to a single unidentified
Explanations for the Identifiable Victim Effect
One common explanation for increased generosity towards individuals rather than groups is that donating toward only one person promotes the feeling that the donor is making a greater proportional difference (Baron, 1997; Featherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997) . For example, Featherstonhaugh and coauthors (1997) found that the perceived benefit of a lifesaving intervention increased as the proportion of people in need increased (e.g., from 4,500/250,000 to 4,500/11,000), while holding the actual number in need constant. Since the size of the denominator is often arbitrary, the impact of proportion suggests that concern can be manipulated relatively easily by, for example, focusing an appeal on a subsection of a group in need instead of the entire group in need.
This 'denominator effect' is robust, likely because it plays on both of the mechanisms identified earlier. When many people are in need, helping a few of them feels subjectively as if one is having only a small impact because one's intervention leaves so many untouched. In contrast, helping a few people out of a total of a few people who need help feels subjectively as if one is having a much larger impact. And, just as thinking of oneself as one out of 6 billion people alive on the earth has a tendency to render ones own life less significant, as the denominator increases of those in need it becomes difficult to identify with, or empathize with, any member of the multitude.
The identifiable victim effect is more, however, than just a 'denominator effect'. Many demonstrations of the identifiable victim effect provide details about an individual rather than varying the number of people highlighted in the request (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; Bohnet & Frey, 1999) . Other research finds that people are less sympathetic and willing to help all members of a small group than they are to help one individual randomly selected from the group (and presented alone; Kogut & Ritov, 2005a) . Since in both of these cases the numerator and denominator are the same (e.g., 5/5 or 1/1), this effect cannot be attributed to an impact of proportionality.
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Why should people be less sympathetic to a small group of individuals than they are to any individual selected individually from the group? A fascinating study by Morewedge and Schooler (2009) may provide an important clue. The study was inspired by Schooler's daughter, who had an aquarium populated by brine-shrimp (popularly known as "sea monkeys") which died, one at a time until there was only one sea monkey left. Schooler noticed that, having previously viewed the sea monkeys as an undifferentiated mass, he and his children became fascinated with the last remaining one, imputing to it a personality and identity and experiencing a concern for its survival that they had not felt for its multitude of brethren. Morewedge and Schooler followed up on this observation with experimental studies. In one study, participants (commuters in Boston) were presented with a black and white image of two-finned sea creatures in a fish tank, and rated the extent to which the creature seemed to possess beliefs, desires, consciousness, and intelligence. The number of other identical sea creatures present (0, 1, 2, 3 or 4) varied for different participants. Participants who saw many sea creatures were less likely to There is evidence that people have a larger emotional response to individual victims rather than a group of victims. People report greater emotional distress for a single identified victim compared to a group of identified victims, and this greater emotional distress corresponds with greater contributions for the single identified victim compared to a group of identified victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a) . attribute high-level mental states to those creatures compared to participants who saw fewer or only one creature. A follow-up study showed a similar effect holding the number of creatures constant, but varying whether the focal creature looked the same or different from its counterparts. Participants were more likely to attribute high-level mental states to those creatures who stood out from among their counterparts compared to those who were one of many similar other creatures.
Assuming that people are more likely to experience emotions, such as sympathy, toward sentient, conscious, intelligent creatures compared to those with less advanced mental states, Morewedge and Schooler's result helps to explain the greater emotion, and hence generosity, evoked by single victims. Other work about the importance of emotion finds that people are more likely to pass along stories that are emotional versus informational (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001 ) and that people are more likely to act upon emotionally-evocative compared to technical information (Sinaceur & Heath, 2005) . Work focusing specifically on the identifiable victim effect finds that priming people to be calculating instead of emotional, for example by having participants solve arithmetic problems before making a donation decision, eliminates the identifiable victim effect by reducing generosity towards identified victims (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic 2007) . In sum, it appears that the ability for people to feel greater emotion towards individual victims is a critical element in understanding the identified victim and related effects.
Tangibility and generosity
A key difference between identified versus statistical victims is that identifiable victims are inherently more tangible than their statistical (and abstract) counterparts. Although the identifiable victim effect could be construed as a special case of tangibility, connections between tangibility and generosity exist beyond the identifiable victim effect. For example, people are more generous toward causes with which they have direct personal experience, and hence more tangible information, such as when AIDS volunteers are more likely to have a loved one who suffered from AIDS than from Alzheimer's Disease, and Alzheimer's Disease volunteers are more likely to have a loved one who suffered from Alzheimer's Disease than from AIDS (Small & Simonsohn, 2007) .
Tangible information, broadly, is information that is specific and concrete as opposed to general and abstract. Information can be inherently tangible, such as when it is highly specific and imbued with rich detail or information can become more tangible due to the way that it is processed. Information that is very "psychologically near" to us (i.e., close or immediate in terms of time, space, or social proximity; see, e.g., Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy) is processed more concretely (Lewin, 1951; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007) . For example, we process information about the present more concretely than we process information about the future (Trope & Liberman, 2003) , and we process events that are spatially close to us more concretely than we process those events that are spatially far away from us (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Lieberman, 2006 ).
In our own research, we have examined diverse consequences of the hypothesis that generosity is positively related to tangibility. For example, in one set of experiments we varied the order in which potential donors made the two most basic choices associated with donating to charity: 1) How much should I donate? and 2) To whom will I give? Both orders are common in charitable giving. Many times, people choose the cause or causes that they will support, and then decide how much to give. Other times, however, people decide the amount first, for example subscribers to the Fidelity® Charitable Gift Fund first contribute money to the fund, typically in the form of appreciated stock at year's end, and then subsequently, at their leisure, decide where to allocate those contributions.
We hypothesized that if people first decide how much money to donate, the recipient would not be concrete when they made the decision. In contrast, if people first decide to whom they wish to donate, the recipient is much more tangible at the moment when they choose an amount. Thus, we hypothesized that people would donate more when they made the 'who' decision before they made the 'how much' decision than if they made the same two decisions in the reverse order.
In experiments testing this idea, we asked participants to make real or hypothetical choices about how much to donate to one of several charitable organizations such as Save The Children, the American Red Cross, and Oxfam America. All participants first viewed a list of charities that they could support, to ensure that everyone knew what organizations they could donate to. Then, participants in one condition first chose one of the charities to support then chose an amount to give, while those in the other condition first chose an amount to give to one of the charities and then picked which organization their donation would go to.
Participants who picked a specific charity first, and then picked an amount to give, donated more than those who made the two decisions in reverse order. This effect was replicated using several procedural variations including hypothetical choice scenarios, decisions made using real money, and decisions made at a within-charity level in which participants were willing to donate more to a charity when they chose a specific fund to support within that charity before deciding how much to give to the charity. One study also demonstrated that participants' assessments of the impact of their donation partially explained the findings. People who chose a specific donation target before deciding how much to give felt as if their donation would have more of an impact, and this increased feeling of impact led to increased giving (Cryder & Loewenstein, 2009 ).
In a second project, we tested a new way to increase the tangibility of a donation target.
Instead of changing the scope of the target as in the project above (considering one charity versus several when deciding how much to give), participants focused on a single charity from the start and received more specific versus less specific information about that charity. In the first experiment, participants read information about the charity Oxfam, and decided how much, if anything, they wished to donate to Oxfam. In one experimental condition, Oxfam was framed in a tangible way with detailed information explaining that one way donations are used is to provide clean water to villagers in West Africa. In another condition, Oxfam was framed in an intangible way with general information explaining that donations would go to a broad range of needs across the globe. Participants who read about Oxfam framed in a tangible way donated almost twice as much as participants who read about Oxfam framed in a general way, and consistent with previous tangibility findings, an increased feeling of impact explained this difference (Cryder, Loewenstein, & Scheines, 2009 ). In a second, "real-world", experiment, we measured generous responses to two different charities that naturally differed in tangibility. In one condition, participants read about an inherently tangible charity ("Nothing but Nets" a charity that provides mosquito protection bed nets to families in Africa). In another condition, participants read about an inherently intangible charity (Oxfam International, an international aid organization that provides aid to people across the globe). Consistent with results from the previous study, participants who read about the tangible charity donated almost three times as much as participants who read about the intangible charity and an increased feeling of impact again mediated this effect (Cryder et al., 2009). contributions that Oxfam America raises in a whole year (Oxfam America, 2009) 
, even though
Oxfam is a much older organization (almost 40 years old) and has sparkling reputation in the non-profit world. Indeed, there have been times when Kiva has been so successful in raising funds, that they could not maintain an adequate supply of loan recipients. In January and March of 2008, there were times when potential Kiva supporters who visited the Kiva website learned that there were no recipients available to fund (Walker, 2008) ; there were more people willing to help than could be listed at that time as needing help. Undoubtedly, the fact that Kiva solicits loans that are repaid to lenders (without interest) instead of soliciting pure donations contributes to Kiva's success. Nevertheless, we suspect that a main factor driving Kiva's success is the constant and tangible link that Kiva provides between contributors and those who are helped.
Decision Making and Policy
It is clear that there is a difference in the way that people value tangible versus intangible victims and causes, however, it is less clear which type of framing is "correct" or should be adopted for decision making. When people learn about the identified victim effect and then participate in an experiment in which they can donate to an identified victim (in one condition) or a statistical victim (in another condition), the identified victim effect disappears, and the equalization between conditions is entirely driven by a decrease in donations to the identified victim (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic 2007) . Similarly, when people simultaneously compare donating to a single victim or donating to a group of victims (compared to considering a single victim or a group of victims in isolation), preference for the single victim disappears and overall donations decrease by over 60% (Kogut & Ritov, 2005b) . It seems almost as if any method of priming a deliberative mindset such as performing math calculations (Small et al., 2007) , gaining information about the identified victim effect (Small et al., 2007) , or comparing different potential recipients (Kogut & Ritov, 2005b) leads to less generosity. Although one interpretation of these results is that a cognitive mindset shrivels an otherwise noble generous tendency, another interpretation is that it squelches immature sentimentality. Somewhat consistent with the latter view is research by Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 1995 (Batson et al., , 1999 showing that empathy-inducing information about an individual causes people to unfairly and inefficiently allocate resources toward that individual and away from other equally (or more) deserving group members. Collectively, this work suggests that we should rely upon our rational selves to guide us in decisions about allocating resources between causes, lest we be steered astray by the biasing powers of emotion. In the case of choosing which of several worthy causes to support, such as in the case of policy decisions, allowing reason to rule may indeed yield the best outcome by allowing each worthy cause to have consideration rather than letting the one that garners the most sympathy to rule.
In the case of individuals choosing whether or not to support a needy cause at all, however, letting ourselves be guided by our heartstrings, and simply therefore being more likely to give, may yield the best collective outcome. Increased individual generosity from those of us with resources to spare may not only benefit the recipients of aid, but may also benefit us as givers. Recent research demonstrates that acting generously increases happiness. People who spend money on others report greater happiness than do those who spend money on themselves, even when people are randomly assigned to spend money on others or themselves (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008) . In addition, mesolimbic reward systems activate when we receive rewards activate when people are informed that they have donated to charity (Moll et al., 2006) . In sum, when individuals act generously, there is opportunity for all parties to benefit, suggesting that acting upon our sympathies in individual decision making can encourage both overall generosity to those in need as well as donor well-being.
As argued by Loewenstein and Small (2007) , the ideal altruistic situation is one in which our sympathies and rational sides align, that is, when both our heart and our head tell us to support the same cause in the same magnitude. When there is conflict, however, relying on our sympathy for decisions about whether to give and relying on our reason for decisions about how to give may yield the best policy of all.
Conclusions
In this chapter we explored how tangible information about victims and needs leads to increases in generosity. We started by discussing demonstrations of the "identifiable victim effect" that illustrate how we respond more generously to identified, individual victims than to statistical groups of victims. We then discussed how the identified victim effect represents a more general phenomenon, namely, that people respond more generously to concrete rather than abstract needs because concreteness allows greater emotion and allows each donor's contribution to feel more impactful. generosity, there may be some types of factual information that allow greater confidence that our contributions will actually make a positive difference. Answers to these questions will not only allow a greater understanding about the foundations of human generosity, but will also, hopefully, lead to new methods to increase philanthropic donations.
